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I. Introduction
The performance of financial systems has been usually measured by variables of financial sector depth and banking sector structure and performance, which are expected to determine the efficiency of capital allocation and thus economic development and growth. While most of the literature has focused on financial sector depth, measured by the ratio of private sector debt to GDP, and its economic impact in developing economies (Levine 2005) , the quality of financial systems in industrialized economies has not been investigated comprehensively so far. Research on indicators to measure the quality with which financial systems perform their main functions (Hartmann et al. 2006 ) focuses on efficiency measures, neglecting aspects of access or distribution. Financial sector breadth or outreach, measured by access of the population to banking services, or geographic and demographic distribution, has only recently been put on the research agenda by the World Bank , Claessens 2006 ).
Concerns about unbanking or unequal access to banking services in developed countries have grown recently, because an ever more sophisticated and efficient financial system seems to go along with the risk of excluding an increasing number of people from financial services (Anderloni et al. 2007 ). This is driven by growing competitive pressure in the banking market due to globalization and technological change. It has led to profound structural changes through mergers, consolidation of branch networks and privatization of state-owned banks in most industrialized countries. These changes are likely to impair the provision of financial services to less profitable and poorly populated areas and to less profitable retail customer segments such as poor households and SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises). Banking consolidation may reduce access of SMEs to finance, if large banks are less prone to lend to SMEs or soft information of relationship lending is lost in mergers and acquisitions.
The effects of technological change on access to finance are ambiguous: on the one hand, electronic distribution channels and progress in credit scoring technology have reduced prices and increased the geographical extent of retail banking markets.
1 On the other hand, replacing bank branches by direct banking channels excludes customers who need personal contact. 2 Since branches are still the most preferred distribution channel of retail banking services, many banks in the EU increasingly rely on them to target their customers' needs for personal advice. Retail banking constitutes over half of the total banking activity and generates 2% of EU GDP annually in gross income (ECB 2007, p. 39) . Therefore, providing access to retail banking services is of great importance.
The German financial system is unique for two reasons: it is the prototype of a bankbased system, and still relies on the three-pillar commercial banking system composed of private banks, public savings banks and cooperative banks. This system has been abandoned by many European countries through privatizing their savings banks.
Even if the state guarantees of the German savings banks were abolished in 2005 because they constituted state aid incompatible with the EC Treaty, these banks are still in public hand and play a major role in the banking sector. In March 2008, savings banks accounted for 34%, private banks for 30% and cooperative banks for 12% of total banking assets (Deutsche Bundesbank 2008a, p. 24) . 3 In the retail banking segment, the savings banks play an even larger role (Bresler et al. 2007 , Mullineux/Terberger 2006 . In contrast to the nationwide operating big private banks, savings and cooperative banks are regional banks. Cooperative banks follow the non-profit mission to support the business of their members. Savings banks have the public mission to provide safe and interest-bearing investment opportunities and access to loans to the local population and SMEs. Their public mandate and ownership are economically justified, if there is a market failure through under-provision of financial services by private and cooperative banks. The often raised claim that because of the public pillar, the German banking sector is overbanked and unprofitable (Koetter et al. 2006) , is premature. The lower profitability of German banks compared to their UK and US counterparts may signal a higher intensity of competition and economic welfare (Neumann/Reichel 2006 , KfW 2005 , Sachverständi-genrat 2008 . The comparatively low concentration and high branch density of the German banking market may imply broader access to financial services.
2 Internet banking usage declines with age and increases with education and wealth (ECB 2007, p. 44; Neuberger 2007; Neuberger/Lehmann 1998) . 3 The savings banks pillar comprises 444 municipal savings banks and 12 Landesbanken, the private bank pillar comprises five big banks (Deutsche Bank AG, Dresdner Bank AG, Hypovereinsbank AG, Commerzbank AG, Deutsche Postbank AG), branches of foreign banks, regional and other banks, and the cooperative bank pillar comprises 1232 local cooperative banks and two central institutions. The remaining banks are special commercial banks.
While cross-country evidence shows a large outreach of the German banking sector at the national level, a comprehensive study at the regional level is missing so far. Economic wealth is unevenly distributed in Germany, with prosperous, economically growing regions concentrated in the south, and poor, economically declining regions in the north and east. Demographic change through population aging and migration of young people to prosperous regions enhances regional disparities. This has caused political concern, given that the German population has a legal entitlement to equal living standards. To achieve this goal, a nationwide provision of bank services may play an important role.
Most of the literature on bank sector outreach is empirical with focus on cross-country evidence (Peachey/Roe 2006, , Claessens 2006 , Anderloni et al. 2007 ).
Recent research examines the welfare effects of Germany's three-pillar banking system theoretically (Neumann/Reichel 2006 , Hakenes/Schnabel 2006 . The outreach of savings banks in East Germany has been investigated empirically (Wengler 2006 ). The present paper provides an overview of the literature, presents hypotheses on determinants of bank outreach and tests them using recent banking and regional data for Germany. We provide descriptive statistics for the outreach of German banks at the federal, federal state, and district level, and use multivariate analyses to examine determinants of branch penetration of savings and cooperative banks at the district level.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II provides an overview of the conceptual framework and measurement of bank outreach. Section III reviews the theoretical literature and hypotheses to be tested, and section IV reviews previous evidence. Section V presents univariate analyses, and section VI multivariate analyses of outreach in the German banking market. Section VII concludes.
II. Conceptual framework and measurement of bank outreach
The term banking sector outreach refers to the access to banking services and their use by households and firms ). There are various dimensions to access: availability of financial services, cost of access, and range, type and quality of financial services offered (Claessens 2006) . Access is not synonymous to use. Economic agents might decide not to use accessible financial services, either for socio-cultural reasons, or because opportunity costs are too high . The counterpart of access is exclusion. Financial exclusion may be caused by (1) 'geographic limitations' due to under-provision of banking services in remote and scarcely populated areas, (2) 'socio-economic limitations' when financial services appear inaccessible to specific income, social or ethnic groups, or (3) 'limitations of opportunity', when new or small firms with profitable projects are credit rationed because of lack of information and collateral (Beck/de la Torre 2006 , Anderloni/Carluccio 2007 .
A broad banking sector outreach is important for economic and social development.
Financial market imperfections cause credit constraints particularly for poor households and small or young entrepreneurs, which are opaque and lack collateral. Broadening their access to banks would ease the financing of high-return investment projects, alleviating poverty and spurring economic growth. Access of talented newcomers to financial services is crucial for Schumpeterian competition and development through the entry of new and innovative firms. Access to finance may even be considered as a basic need such as clean water, health services and education (Peachy/Roe 2006) . 4 However, it is unclear whether there is a public goods argument for extending access more broadly. Some households or firms may not demand financial services at the prevailing costs or may not be credit-worthy, and some banks may not wish to provide financial services to all customers, because it is not profitable or too risky (Claessens 2006 , Beck/de la Torre 2006 . Voluntary self-exclusion does not constitute a problem of access, unless it results from unduly low levels of financial literacy or financial market discrimination.
Evidence on financial exclusion is scarce, because it is hard to measure, and data on the use of financial services by households and firms is limited (Claessens 2006) . As an analytical tool to measure financial sector outreach, Beck and de la Torre (2006) suggested the access possibilities frontier as the intersection of potential supply and demand. Potential supply denotes the maximum outreach that can be provided given the institutional framework, macroeconomic environment, or technology. Potential demand is the demand predicted by economic factors. Starting from this frontier, there are three access problems: a lack of demand due to voluntary self-exclusion, a gap between actual and potential supply due to incomplete competition or other supply-side constraints, and a frontier that is too low in international comparisons because of the state variables (Beck/de la Torre 2006, p. 47) . This framework can be used for the debate on how to expand bank outreach by private solutions or public policies.
4 For reviews see and Beck/de la Torre (2006) .
To measure bank outreach, several proxy indicators have been used in the literature (see use, and higher loan-or deposit-income-ratios signal that these services may only be affordable to larger enterprises or wealthier individuals. The loan-income-ratio is about 2 in rich countries, but above 8 in poor countries (Beck et al. 2006, pp. 8) . Alternative measures of deposit penetration are the deposit-GDP-ratio and the cash-deposit-ratio.
According to Peachy and Roe (2006, p. 15) , an economy has reached full access, if the deposit-GDP-ratio is 100% or the cash-deposit-ratio is below 20%. This measures the development of the financial system rather than deposit penetration. For the indicators (2)-(9), a country may be considered approaching full access, if its outreach indicator lies above the mean value in developed countries (Beck and de la Torre 2006).
Table1 :

Indicators of banking sector outreach
Indicator Measurement
(1) Bank accounts per adult Number of bank accounts per adult (2) Geographic branch penetration Number of branches per 1,000 km² (3) Demographic branch penetration Number of branches per 100,000 people (4) Geographic ATM penetration Number of bank ATMs per 1,000 km² (5) Demographic ATM penetration Number of bank ATMs per 100,000 people (6) Demographic loan penetration Number of loans per 100,000 people (7) Loan-income-ratio Average size of loans to GDP per capita (8) Demographic deposit penetration Number of deposits per 100,000 people (9) Deposit-income-ratio (or deposit-GDP-ratio) Average size of deposits to GDP per capita (or total bank deposits to GDP) (10) Cash-deposit-ratio Cash in circulation to total bank deposits Source: own composition, , Peachy/Roe (2006) .
Even if these outreach indicators are easy to measure, they have shortcomings: they are crude quantity-based indicators that ignore new delivery channels of financial services and costs of accessing and using banking services. When applied to a country, they assume a uniform distribution of bank outlets, loans and deposits, as well as of the population and GDP per capita. In most countries, however, bank branches and ATMs are concentrated in urban or prosperous regions, and the size of loans and deposits may be unevenly distributed . Therefore, it is necessary to measure banking outreach also on the regional level.
III. Theory and hypotheses
Hypotheses about determinants of bank outreach can be derived from the concept of the access possibilities frontier and microeconomics of supply and demand. On the supply side, access to banking services depends on the bank's strategy and cost management as well as on state variables such as market size, macroeconomic fundamentals, available technology, per capita income, intensity of competition and the legal and institutional environment. On the demand side, price and income level are the main economic determinants of the use of financial services. For a given price and income level, actual demand may be lower than potential demand because of self-exclusion arising from non economic reasons as financial illiteracy, ethnic or religious factors (Beck/de la Torre 2006). Since supply-side theories play the major role in explaining banking sector outreach in developed countries, we will focus on them.
For the supply of banking services, fixed production costs play a large role. At the level of the firm, fixed costs arise from the brick-and-mortar branch network, computer and accounting systems, legal services, and security arrangements. Fixed costs also arise at the level of individual transactions and clients: the costs of an individual payments or savings transaction are independent of the value of the transaction, and the costs of maintaining an account for a client are independent on the number and size of that client's transactions (Beck/de la Torre 2006, p. 7).
The higher are the fixed costs at the firm or branch level, the higher are the economies of scale that can be reaped by an expansion of output and the lower will be the number of banks or bank branches in the long-run market equilibrium. This has been shown within a spatial competition model of banks that compete on deposit and loan markets (Chiappori et al. 1995) . Hence, fixed costs constitute an important limitation to geographic outreach in the provision of retail banking services. At the level of the client, economies of scale can be seized by raising the number or volume of transactions. This implies that lowincome clients that need small and few payment and savings transactions may not be profitable customers for profit-maximizing banks (Beck/de la Torre 2006, p. 8) . Financial exclusion of these customers implies smaller demographic outreach.
Generally, the higher are the fixed costs relative to market size or individual demand, the lower is the efficient number of banks, bank branches or clients served. Thus, outreach depends negatively on fixed costs, but positively on the size of the market or bank.
Moreover, the outreach of an individual bank decreases as the number of competitors rises, reducing residual demand. Banking consolidation to reap economies of scale may increase monopolistic market power, restricting output and outreach. On the other hand, gains from monopoly power may ease the financing of a larger branch network.
These production cost arguments neglect the role of banks to reduce problems of incomplete information by advising and monitoring customers. A reduction of the branch network involves opportunity costs through losses of customers or profits from providing personal contact and advice, and higher risk costs through less monitoring of borrowers.
Although the use of electronic banking channels and transaction lending technologies has increased for standardized banking products and wholesale customers, the branch network with provision of informational and advisory services is still the most preferred distribution channel in retail banking markets (ECB 2007) . It is crucial for providing relationship banking services by maintaining proximity to clients. This applies above all to market segments with high information asymmetry like SMEs and households, where banks perform a monitoring function (Diamond 1994) . Under relationship lending, the bank relies on soft information gathered through direct contact of the loan officer with the borrower and its local community over time (Berger/Udell 2006) . This lending technology addresses the problem of information opacity, in contrast to transaction lending based on "hard" quantitative data. Theoretically, the optimal geographic outreach would be given at the point where the marginal costs of increasing the branch network and information services are equal to the marginal gains from a reduction of transaction costs and information asymmetry.
Small, regional banks are likely to have a comparative advantage in gathering and verifying soft information, because they are closer to their customers in local markets (Agarwal/Hauswald 2007 , Hauswald/Marquez 2006 . Soft information is difficult to quantify and transmit through the communication channels of large organizations (Berger/Udell 2002 , 2003 , which in turn may have an advantage in transaction lending. A centralized hierarchical bank offers greater incentives to employ hard information (Stein 2002 , Degryse et al. 2007 ). This implies that outreach to retail banking customers is larger for small, decentralized banks compared to large, hierarchical banks, which specialize on wholesale customers. Employing a model of banking competition with different organizational structures, Degryse et al. (2006) predict that a bank's geographic outreach decreases when rival banks are more hierarchically organized and lending decisions are communicated more swiftly at rival banks. Banking consolidation may impair access of SMEs to finance, because large banks are less prone to lend to SMEs or soft information of relationship lending is lost in mergers and acquisitions.
Regarding social welfare, the supply of profit maximizing banks involves an underprovision of financial services in a region, if positive externalities drive a wedge between the social and private marginal benefits from broadening outreach. A positive intraregional externality is likely to result from investment finance within the region, which fosters regional entrepreneurial activity (Hakenes/Schnabel 2006, p. 2) . Employing a model with credit rationing and heterogeneous regions, Hakenes and Schnabel (2006) show that in a financially integrated economy without public banks, there is a capital drain from poor to rich regions, because lenders will transfer their funds to the regions with the highest endowments, where they obtain the highest interest rates. While private banks cannot improve upon this allocation, a public bank can prevent the capital drain if it is sufficiently subsidized to offer a competitive deposit rate. Obeying a regional principle, it internalizes the intra-regional externality from investing within the region. To some extent, the same result can be achieved by a cooperative bank that endogenously establishes a regional principle by lending only to its members. In contrast to public banks, cooperative banks cannot internalize positive externalities of production on the non-entrepreneurs and mobilize funds from them. However, they are better than public banks in ensuring access to capital for the poor and moral-hazard-prone industries within a region.
Using a Cournot oligopoly model, Neumann and Reichel (2006) show that the presence of a non profit maximizing public or cooperative bank has positive welfare effects by increasing equilibrium output to the competitive level, compared to the Cournot equilibrium level of competition between private banks. An equilibrium with both banking groups is only viable, if the average cost of the private bank is lower than that of the public or cooperative bank. The private bank's cost advantage is likely to result from its smaller branch network and economies of scale due to larger firm size and centralized organization. The model predicts that the output of a private bank reacts more strongly to a change in demand, because average costs rise (fall) less rapidly as output expands (decreases), compared to the case of a public or cooperative bank. This implies that private, profit maximizing banks retreat more rapidly from regions with declining demand than non profit maximizing banks.
Thus, Germany's three-pillar banking system with state-owned banks may be justified by the failure of private banks and to some extent also of cooperative banks (Hakenes/Schnabel 2006) to supply a socially optimal outreach. Because German savings banks have a public mission to serve all regions and customers beyond the goal of economic efficiency, we expect that their outreach is broader and less dependent on the external factors affecting the outreach of a pure profit maximizing bank (Wengler 2006 ).
However, because of the regional principle, they are more dependent on the situation of their business district, with which they form a 'common destiny'. Therefore, economic wealth and population density may have a large impact on the outreach of public savings banks, as long as they strive for economic efficiency.
Summarizing, we derive the following hypotheses: -H1: Bank outreach increases with economic wealth in a region (profit or efficiency goal).
-H2: Bank outreach increases with population density in a region (profit or efficiency goal).
-H3: Bank outreach decreases with the number of competitors in a region (profit goal).
-H4: Bank outreach increases with the size of the bank in a region (profit or efficiency goal).
-H5: The outreach of small, decentralized banks (large, centralized banks) increases (decreases) with the demand for retail banking services in a region (profit or efficiency goal).
-H6: Public savings banks provide a broader outreach than private and cooperative banks (public mission).
IV. Previous evidence
Most of the previous studies investigate bank outreach on the national level for crosssections of countries. They show large differences between poor and rich economies, consistent with H1. In a nutshell, the percentage rate of access in poorer developing countries (some 10%) is about equal to the percentage rate of exclusion in richer advanced industrial economies (Peachey/Roe 2006, p. 14). There are large variations of outreach both within the group of developing and transition economies and the group of advanced industrial countries. Among the latter, the relatively urbanized social market economies of Europe (the Scandinavian countries, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain) and Japan have the largest bank outreach with access above 95%. The Anglo-Saxon market economies of the UK, US and Australia rank behind. The lowest outreach is found in Ireland and the more southerly EU states except Spain, where average access seems to be reduced by a larger share of rural regions and greater regional income inequality.
However, the problem of geographic exclusion is not restricted to these countries. Across the developed world there is growing concern that commercial banks are concentrating their outreach on more profitable customers and regions, because the private benefits of Koetter et al. 2006 , Bresler et al. 2007 , Sachverständigenrat 2008 . However, there are large regional variations and differences between the three banking groups, with the state-owned savings banks providing the most even regional distribution of branches (Bresler et al. 2007 , Wengler 2005 . The first attempt to investigate the determinants of bank outreach on the regional level has been made by Wengler (2006) 5 Deutsche Bundesbank (2008b, This supports H6.
To examine branch penetration (indicators (2) and (3) there are large differences in branch penetration among the federal states (see Table 2 ). The city states (Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen) show the lowest demographic, but highest geographic branch penetration, because of their comparatively high population density and small size.
Among the larger federal states with low population density, the East German states Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Brandenburg have the lowest branch penetration. tends to be higher in more densely populated states and in the West/South compared to the East/North, with cooperative banks being least concentrated on the city states. In East Germany, private banks show a higher branch penetration than the other groups. This may be due to the fact that the "Staatsbank" of the former German Democratic Republic with its large branch network was taken over by two big private banks in 1990. In all other regions (West, North, Middle South), branch penetration of savings banks exceeds that of private and cooperative banks, except in Southern Germany, where the cooperative banks show the highest outreach. Data about the outreach of bank loans, measured by indicators (6) and (7), are not available for the German banking sector, except some survey data about the number of loans. According to a 2007 survey, only two loans were used by 11 inhabitants, which yields a demographic loan penetration of 18,182 (number of loans per 100,000 people).
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This is below the average of 50,000 in the richest countries, where every other uses a bank loan ). Also here, there are regional variations at the federal state level, with the lowest demographic loan penetration in Saarland (12,500) and the highest in Saxony-Anhalt (28,571). 12 There seems to be a West-East and a South-North gap, with higher demographic loan penetration in the East/North than in the West/South of Germany. This does not indicate better loan access, but higher loan use in the East/North, as loan demand tends to be higher because of lower per capita incomes there.
Since the loan-income-ratio cannot be calculated because of missing data about individual loan sizes, we calculate instead the ratio of the total loan volume to GDP at the federal state level. While a higher value of the loan-income-ratio defined in Table 1 indicates worse access to smaller loans, a higher value of our loan-GDP-ratio indicates higher loan access or use. Spiegel (2007) with H1). 13 However, loan-GDP-ratios are higher in the North than in the South, consistent with the findings for demographic loan penetration. Access to loans is of particular importance to SMEs, which comprise 99.7% of all enterprises and 70.9% of all employees in Germany (IMF 2007) . On the federal level, the share of savings banks in the SME loan market exceeds that of the other two banking groups: in 2005, savings banks provided 43.1%, private banks 16.2% and cooperative banks 14.5% of all SME loans. In the trade sector with mainly small firms, the market share of the savings banks reaches even 69.8% (DSGV 2006a, p. 9 Similar regional variations apply to the deposit-GDP-ratio (outreach indicator (9)) shown in Summing up, we find that although banking sector outreach is high in Germany, there are regional disparities showing both a West-East and a South-North gap regarding access to bank branches, ATMs and loans as well as use of bank accounts and deposits. Even if these descriptive statistics on the federal state level are crude, they tend to support the hypothesis that bank outreach increases with regional economic wealth. Comparing the three pillars of the German banking system, we find that public savings banks provide a larger loan and deposit penetration, and in most federal states also branch penetration, compared to private and cooperative banks. With their larger deposit penetration in the less wealthy Eastern and Northern regions, they tend to reduce regional disparities.
Bank outreach at the district level
Looking at smaller regions or districts, we observe an uneven distribution of the population. In the OECD average, about a third of a country's population is concentrated because it cooperates with the Deutsche Post AG, which has a public mandate to provide nationwide services. Therefore, Table 2 shows a larger branch penetration for the private banking pillar than Table 4 .
VI. Multivariate analysis
Data set, measurements and method
We employ multivariate analyses to test the hypotheses about branch penetration for savings and cooperative banks at the district level, using regional and bank-specific data.
The regional data were taken from the data bases 'Statistik regional' (Statistische Ämter
2006) and 'INKAR' (BBR 2005)
. Bank-specific data were obtained from DSGV (2006b) and BVR (2005) . Comparable data for private banks are not available.
To combine regional and bank-specific data, a region should correspond to a bank's business district. In the case of savings banks, this applies to most districts and independent cities, which incurred the guarantor liability of 'their' savings bank until
2005
. 20 In those cases, in which the business district of a savings bank comprises more than one region (district or independent city), we aggregated these regions. In those cases, in which a region comprises the business districts of several savings banks, we aggregated these banks. The resulting data set covers almost 95% of all savings banks (463 in 2005) and almost 90% of all districts and independent cities of Germany for the period 2001-
2005.
For the cooperative banks (1,262 in 2005) , geographic market delineation is less clear.
Because of the mission to promote their members, cooperative banks are also regionally bounded, however less strictly than public savings banks. Data about the business areas of German cooperative banks are missing. We define the business district of a cooperative bank as the region (district or independent city), in which the bank's headquarter is located. In those cases, in which more than one bank is assigned to a region, these banks are aggregated. The resulting data set comprises 97% of all cooperative banks and 87% of all districts and independent cities of Germany in 2005. Data about the number of branches per cooperative bank are not available. We used the bank branch statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank (2001 Bundesbank ( -2003 , which contain the number of branches per banking 20 Therefore, spatial autocorrelations can be exluded (Wengler 2006, p. 253). group at the district level until 2003. These data were extrapolated until 2005 by using the available rates of changes at the federal level. 
Regression results
The regression results for geographic branch penetration of savings banks (2001, 2005) and cooperative banks (2005) are reported in Table 6 . Economic wealth shows a highly significant positive influence on branch penetration of both groups, indicating that they Thus, both kinds of regional banks provide less branches per km² in less densely populated regions, according to the efficiency goal (H2). Since this reaction is less than proportional, the number of branches per inhabitant is higher in less densely populated regions. Comparable regressions for demographic branch penetration yield the same results for all independent variables, except a negative influence of population density.
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Hence, small, decentralized banks provide a larger number of branches per inhabitant in less densely populated regions, serving the inhabitants' demand for retail banking services. Wengler (2006) also found an elasticity of geographic branch penetration with respect to population density smaller than one for the case of savings banks, but larger than one for the case of big private banks in East Germany in 1998 22 The elasticities of geographic and demographic branch penetration with respect to population density sum up to about 1. Branch penetration of savings and cooperative banks is significantly higher in regions with a larger share of elder people. The share of the elderly may be a proxy for the demand for retail banking services. In Germany, today's seniors are the most wealthy age group with a high demand for bank deposits (Grabka/Krause 2005) . They are less likely to use direct banking, preferring personal contact and advice at a local bank branch. Thus, we find support for H5. On the other hand, elder people have lower demand for loans than younger people. The age structure may also be a proxy for a region's economic activity or attractiveness, which influence migration flows. In rural or regions with a declining population, the share of elder people is higher than in industrial or dynamic regions attracting young people. The large impact of the share of the elderly on the branch penetration of cooperative banks may partly reflect their concentration on rural regions.
Banking competition has a significant negative effect on the branch penetration of both groups, in line with H3. The elasticity is much lower for savings banks (-0.28) than for cooperative banks (-0.94 ). This indicates that savings banks fulfill their public mission to serve all regions, fostering competition.
Branch penetration of both groups increases significantly with bank size, in line with H4. This corresponds to the results of Wengler (2006) and indicates again that public savings banks pursue the goal of economic efficiency beyond their public mission. The smaller elasticity in the case of cooperative banks may be due to their smaller size, which restrains the possibility to reap economies of scale by establishing additional branches.
To examine the explanatory power of the single variables, we performed univariate regressions. Tables 8 and 9 (appendix) show that the share of the elderly and competition play a very minor role. The signs and significance levels of the regression coefficients are the same as in Table 6 , except for the variable competition loosing its influence in the case of savings banks. This is another hint to their public mission. To investigate whether the branching strategy differs between savings and cooperative banks, we regressed the branch market shares on regional economic variables and bank size. The results are presented in Table 7 . An increase in economic wealth has a significant negative influence on the branch market share of savings banks, while the reverse holds for cooperative banks. This indicates that due to their public mission, savings banks maintain a higher branch penetration in less wealthy regions, compared to all other banks. Population density has no significant effect on the market share of savings banks, but a significant negative effect on that of cooperative banks. This may reflect that cooperative banks concentrate on less densely populated rural regions, while savings bank branches are most evenly distributed. The share of elder people has a positive influence on the branch market share of savings banks, indicating that they specialize on retail deposit customers (consistent with H5). This does not hold for cooperative banks. The branch market shares of both groups increase with bank size, as expected. All together, the independent variables explain 58% of the variation in the market shares of cooperative banks, but only 17% of those of savings banks. Thus, the branching policy of savings banks is less dependent on regional economic factors, due to their public mission. The univariate regression results are shown in Tables 10 and 11 (appendix).
VII. Conclusions
The present paper tried to explain geographic and demographic outreach of the German banking system. After a review on the conceptual framework and theoretical literature we derived hypotheses on the determinants of bank outreach for profit-or efficiency-oriented banks and savings banks with a public mission. These were confronted with evidence for German banks. A review of the empirical literature revealed a research gap with respect to studies on the regional level. While in international comparisons the German banking sector shows a high outreach performance, the distribution of banking services over smaller regions and the three pillars of the banking sector has not been thoroughly investigated so far. The present paper yields two contributions to close this gap: first, it examines different outreach measures at the federal state and district levels for the three banking pillars by univariate analyses. Secondly, it seeks to explain the branch penetration of the regional savings and cooperative banks in all German districts by multivariate analyses.
Our main results are as follows. First, all three banking groups -private, public savings and cooperative banks -show a broader outreach in economically wealthy and more densely populated regions. This is economically efficient and the result of higher demand for banking services when household income and the number of customers are higher.
However, due to their public mission, savings banks maintain a higher branch penetration in less wealthy regions, compared to all other banks. With their comparatively large branch, deposit and loan penetration in less wealthy and less densely populated regions, public savings banks help to reduce regional disparities in access to and use of banking services within Germany.
Secondly, public savings banks provide a broader outreach to retail banking customers than private banks, holding dominant positions in deposit and SME loan markets. Due to their decentralized organization and regional principle, they help to reduce information and transaction costs by relationship banking close to the customers. In regions with a larger share of elder people, savings and cooperative banks provide more branches than in "younger regions", serving customers who need personal contact and advice. Savings banks show a higher specialization on 'elder regions' than cooperative banks.
Third, because of their public mission to serve all regions, savings banks foster competition. The lower competitive pressure in those regions, which are unattractive for private or cooperative banks may help them to cover the costs of fulfilling their public mandate.
In sum, our results show that the German three-pillar banking system performs well in providing nationwide banking services. They support microeconomic theories of banking, which explain welfare benefits of a division of labor between large, centrally organized private banks and small, de-central savings and cooperative banks. The regional principle and public mandate of savings banks seem to contribute to the goal of equal living standards across German regions, which show large disparities in economic wealth and population density. Thus, we support the recent recommendation of the German Council of Economic Advisors to maintain the regional principle and public mandate of the German savings banks (Sachverständigenrat 2008) . 23 However, the present study is only a first step to explain differences among the three banking pillars in providing access to banking services. The analysis will be extended in future work. 23 Moreover, the Sachverständigenrat (2008) recommends to transform the state-owned savings banks into stock corporations in the majority ownership of foundations. The question whether this would improve the performance of the German banking system is beyond the scope of the present paper. While gains in economic efficiency are likely, positive effects on bank outreach are unlikely. 
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